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THE INFLUENCE OF THE ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT'S
OPINIONS ON POLICY MADE BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY: A
CASE STUDY
Chuck Smith*

Courts do more than interpret the law; they are also politicallyinfluenced policymakers. This view became a departure point for the
research of political scientists after Peltason' focused attention on courts as
actors in the political process. Since then, scholars have explored the
political aspects of courts at every point in the judicial process. An
indication of the extent of this research can be found by surveying the
literature on state supreme courts. Social scientists and legal scholars have
examined every facet of state courts of last resort. They have explored
variables that influence the selection of judges,2 the decision-making

* Assistant Professor of Political Science, West Virginia State College; B.A. West
Virginia State College, 1987; M.A. University of New Mexico, 1989; Ph.D. University of
Kentucky, 1994. Data from my Ph.D. dissertation was used to write this article. Professor
Bradley C. Canon, Department of Political Science, University of Kentucky, contributed
useful criticism and suggestions for both the dissertation and this article. Members of the
Supreme Court of Arkansas and of the Arkansas Senate graciously consented to be
interviewed for this research. Their insights contributed greatly to the understanding of the
policy-making dynamics between state supreme courts and state legislatures.
1. JACK PELTASON, FEDERAL COURTS IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS (1955).

2. Burton M. Atkins & Henry R. Glick, Formal Judicial Recruitment and State
Supreme Court Decisions, 2 AM. POL. Q. 427 (1974); Kathleen L. Barber, Ohio Judicial
Elections-Nonpartisan Premises With Partisan Results, 32 OHIO ST. L.J. 762 (1971);
Bradley C. Canon, The Impact of Formal Selection Processes On the Characteristics of
Judges-Reconsidered, 6 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 579 (1972); Victor Fango & Craig Ducat, What
Difference Does the Method of Judicial Selection Make? Selection Procedures In State
Courts of Last Resort, 5 JUST. Sys. J. 25 (1979); Henry R. Glick & Craig F. Emmert,
Selection Systems and Judicial Characteristics: The Recruitment of State Supreme Court
Judges, 70 JUDICATURE 228 (1986); Charles H. Sheldon, Influencing the Selection ofJudges:
The Variety and Effectiveness of State Bar Activities, 30 W. POL. Q. 397 (1977).
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behavior of judges,3 the political nature of their decisions,4 the compliance
with the decisions,5 and the implementation and impact of the decisions.6
My research interest is in a somewhat different aspect of judicial
politics: the influence of state supreme courts7 on the policy-making of
legislatures. By examining fifty-two legislative responses to court opinions
in twenty-six states, I discovered that including a policy message to the
legislature in a state supreme court opinion is an effective method for the
court to influence legislative policy-making. 8 This article illuminates these
findings by presenting a case study of five opinions of the Arkansas
Supreme Court concerning the compensation of court-appointed counsel that
contain a series of progressively stronger and more direct policy messages
addressed to the General Assembly. The article then explores the influence
of those messages on subsequent policy made by the Arkansas legislature.
3. Burton M. Atkins & Henry R. Glick, Environmental and Structural Variables As
Determinants of Issues in State Courts of Last Resort, 20 AM. J. POL. SCI. 97 (1976); Bradley
C. Canon, Defining the Dimensions of JudicialActivism, 66 JUDICATURE 236 (1981); Gibson,
From Simplicity to Complexity: The Developments of Theory in the Study of Judicial
Behavior, 5 POL. BEHAV. 7 (1983); HENRY R. GLICK, STATE SUPREME COURTS IN STATE
POLITICS (1971); Stanton Wheeler et al, Do the "Haves" Come Out Ahead? Winning and
Losing In State Supreme Courts, 1870-1970, 21 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 403 (1987); John T.
Wold, Political Orientations, Social Backgrounds, and Role Perceptions of State Supreme
Court Judges, 27 W. POL. Q. 239 (1974).
4. Edward N. Beiser, The Rhode Island Supreme Court: A Well-Integrated Political
System, 8 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 167 (1973); SUSAN FINO, THE ROLE OF STATE SUPREME COURT
IN THE NEW JUDICIAL FEDERALISM (1987); Robert A. Kagan, et al., The Business of State

Supreme Courts, 1870-1970, 30 STAN. L. REV. 121 (1977); Robert A. Kagan, et al., The
Evolution of State Supreme Courts, 76 MICH. L. REV. 961 (1978).
5. CAROL JENSON, THE NETWORK OF CONTROL: STATE SUPREME COURTS AND STATE
SECURITY STATUTES, 1920-1970 (1982); G. ALAN TARR, JUDICIAL IMPACT AND STATE
SUPREME COURTS (1977).

6. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protectionof Individual Rights,
90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977); Rovert D. Brussack, Note, Of Laboratories and Liberties:
State Court Protection of Politicaland Civil Rights, 10 GA. L. REV. 533 (1976); Gregory A.
Caldeira, On the Reputation of State Supreme Courts, 5 POL. BEHAV. 83 (1983); Bradley C.
Canon & Lawrence Baum, Patternsof Adoption of Tort Law Innovations:An Application of
Diffusion Theory to Judicial Doctrines, 75 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 975 (1981); Bradley C.
Canon & Dean Jaros, The Impact of Changes in Judicial Doctrine: The Abrogation of
Charitable Immunity, 13 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 969 (1979); MARY C. PORTER & G. ALAN
TARR, STATE SUPREME COURTS: POLICYMAKERS INTHE FEDERAL SYSTEM (1982); G. ALAN
TARR & MARY C. PORTER, STATE SUPREME COURTS IN THE STATE AND NATION (1988).
7. In this article, the term "supreme court" is used to refer to a state's court of last
resort; I recognize that in a few states that court is identified as the court of appeals or the
supreme court of appeals. When the national supreme court is referred to, it is identified as
the United States Supreme Court.
8. Charles E. Smith, No Thicket Too Political: A Cross-State Analysis of State
Supreme Court Opinions' Influence on Legislative Policy-Making (1994) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Kentucky).
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I.

JUDICIAL INFLUENCE ON LEGISLATIVE POLICY-MAKING

Policy made by a state's supreme court is only part of the state's
overall policy-making process. To understand the policy-making by state
supreme courts, studies of these courts need to be linked to the policymaking and political roles of other policy-making institutions in the state.
Research into the dynamics between the legislative and judicial branches of
the same government has been limited in two ways. First, the study has
almost exclusively focused on Congress and the United States Supreme
Court.9 Second, that focus was primarily on policy confrontations between
Congress and the Warren Court and on various attempts at court-curbing.'0
More needs to be known about the interactive role of state supreme courts
and legislatures in the development of state policy regulating social and
economic life. As Henry Glick has argued, "We need to explore more fully
the distinctive role of each institution, their interactions in formulating
policy, and their effects on the states."''
A limited amount of research has examined the policy-making dynamic
between state supreme courts and legislatures. Glick argued that state
supreme courts demonstrate an interest in legislative policy-making and
convey their policy preferences to legislatures through several channels of
communication. 2 John Felice and John Kilwein found that Ohio legislators
9. For example, a recent essay on the relationship between the coordinate branches of
government cites 43 references, all addressing the federal government. See Jeffrey A. Segal,
Courts, Executives, and Legislatures, in THE AMERICAN COURTS: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT
(John B. Gates & Charles A. Johnson eds., 1991). An institutional-level examination of
congressional modifications of United States Supreme Court decisions is presented in
Congressional Reversal of Supreme Court Decisions: 1945-1957. 71 HARv. L. REV. 1324
(1958). A more ambitious case study examined congressional response to four cases that
resulted in the overturning of convictions of Communists in the mid-1950s, WALTER
MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY (1964).
10. Examples of such research are Harry P. Stumpf, Congressional Response to
Supreme Court Rulings: The Interaction of Law and Politics, 14 J. PUB. L. 377 (1965); C.
HERMAN PRITCHETT, CONGRESS VERSUS THE SUPREME COURT 1957-1960 (1961); JOHN R.
SCHMIDHAUSER & LARRY L. BERG, THE SUPREME COURT AND CONGRESS: CONFLICT AND
INTERACTION 1945-1968 (1972); Roger Handberg & Harold F. Hill, Court Curbing, Court
Reversals, andJudicialReview: The Supreme Court Versus Congress, 14 LAW & SOC'Y REV.
309 (1980); Henschen, Statutory Interpretations of the Supreme Court: Congressional
Response, 11 AM. POL. Q. 441 (1983).
11. Henry R. Glick, Policy Making and State Supreme Courts, in THE AMERICAN
COURTS: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 115 (John B. Gates & Charles A. Johnson eds., 1991).
12. Henry Robert Glick, Policy Making and State Supreme Courts: The Judiciaryas an
Interest Group, 5 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 271, 276-277 (1970). Based on a survey of 43 chief
justices, he discovered that every court in his sample used court opinions to convey their
policy preferences to the legislature. Other methods of communication were conferences
with legislators, testimony at legislative hearings, advisory opinions, and copies of certain
opinions being sent to the legislature. Forms of indirect communication of policy preferences
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do take note of the activities of their state supreme court. 3 Further, three
studies of state supreme court policy-making on particular issues also
provide knowledge about the courts' influence on legislatures. Especially
valuable is Glick's cross-state comparison of the development of right-to-die
policy.4 In addition, the sometimes bitter policy disputes between state
supreme courts and legislatures over the issue of school finance are
portrayed in Richard Lehne's exhaustive case study of the early New Jersey
litigation and by Gregory Rocha and Richard Webking's study of the Texas
school finance cases.' 5
These studies indicate that written opinions of the court are a particularly important channel of communication because both legislators and
justices see them as the court's chief means to convey its policy views to
the legislature. 6 However, two important points need to be stressed. First,
policy messages to the legislature are not a commonplace feature of supreme
were made through conferences with governors and other executive officials,
recommendations of judicial councils, and lobbying by allied interest groups such as bar
associations. Id.
13. John D. Felice & John C. Kilwein, High Court-LegislativeRelations: A View from
the Ohio Statehouse, 77 JUDICATURE 42 (1993). Their research is based on interviews with
127 members (96%) of the Ohio General Assembly. They found that legislators most
common source of information about the Ohio Supreme Court was from mainstream media.
The next most common sources of information, listed in descending order according to the
frequency with which they were mentioned were The Ohio Bar (a publication of the Ohio
Bar Association), court opinions, lobbyists, personal contact with members of the court, other
legislators, the Legislative Service Commission, constituents, word of mouth, governor's
office, other judges, and state agencies. Id.
14. Henry R. Glick, The Right-to-Die: State Policymaking and the Elderly, 5 J. AGING
STUD. 283 (1991); HENRY R. GLICK, THE RIGHT-TO-DIE: POLICY INNOVATION AND ITS
CONSEQUENCES (1992).
15.

RICHARD LEHNE, THE QUEST FOR JUSTICE: THE POLITICS OF SCHOOL FINANCE

REFORM (1978). This study examines the New Jersey Legislature's response to state supreme
court's decision in Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973). Since that time the court
and legislature have again struggled with the issue. See Abbott v. Burke, 495 A.2d 376 (N.J
1985); and Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359 (N.J. 1990). GREGORY G. ROCHA & RICHARD H.
WEBKING, POLITICS IN PUBLIC EDUCATION: EDGEWOOD V. KIRBY AND THE REFORM OF

PUBLIC SCHOOL EDUCATION FINANCING IN TEXAS (2d ed. 1993). This work provides a step-

by-step description of the legislative response to three school finance cases: CarrolltonFarmers Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist., 826 S.W.2d 488 (Tex. 1992);
Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 804 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. 1991); and Edgewood Indep.
Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989).
16. See Glick, supra note 11, at 276; LEHNE, supra note 15, at 53, reporting a New
Jersey Supreme Court justice's striking claim about the influence of court opinions:
The quality of judicial writing is one of encouraging the legislature, setting
activities in motion which will have secondary consequences to lead senators and
assemblymen to act. This is the essence of democracy. We can encourage the
legislature to pass laws or taxes without directing them to do that. This is the
wonder of our system, and besides it works to accomplish judicial objectives.
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court opinions. In most cases, the court interprets, applies, or enforces
existing policy. Courts tend to show great deference to the legislative-made
policy and infrequently criticize or strike down statutes. " Therefore, in the
bulk of its decisions, a court has no reason to express its policy views to
legislators. Second, while communication between the state supreme court
and the legislature is a significant part of a state's policy-making process,
such communication is neither extensive nor frequent. Compared to the
amount of communication between the legislature and the executive branch,
the communication between the legislature and the court is occasional and
limited. However, such communication tends to address consequential
policy issues. Accordingly, it is important that the role of court communication in policy-making is understood.

17. Widely accepted principles of constitutional interpretation provide that the
constitutionality of a statute is presumed. Where a statute may be interpreted in two ways,
one interpretation being constitutional and the other unconstitutional, the constitutional
interpretation is to be used. See, e.g., Americans United v. Rogers, 538 S.W.2d 711 (Mo.
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1029 (1976). The Supreme Court of Missouri argued that
"[]udicial deference is not indicative of the avoidance of a duty but to the contrary is the
performance thereof with an appreciation that judicial interference with the legislative process
should occur only when there is an unavoidable and legally compelling reason to do so."
Id. at 721.
Courts are also reluctant to strike down legislative policy for fear of engaging in
judicial legislation. See, e.g., Thompson v. Engelking, 537 P.2d 635 (Idaho 1975).
Explaining its reluctance to overturn the state's public school finance policy, the Idaho
Supreme Court contended that "to do otherwise ... this Court would convene as a 'superlegislature,' legislating in a turbulent field of social, economic and political policy." Id. at
640.
Courts have also argued that the more extensive resources of legislatures better equip
them to make complex policy. See, e.g., Rasmussen ex rel. Mitchell v. Fleming, 741 P.2d
674 (Ariz. 1987). The Supreme Court of Arizona called on the legislature to develop a
detailed right-to-die policy for the state. It maintained that "the Legislature is best suited
to address these matters in a comprehensive manner. Only the Legislature has the resources
necessary to gather and synthesize the vast quantities of information needed to formulate
guidelines that will best accommodate the rights and interests of the many individuals and
institutions involved in these tragic situations." Id. at 692.
Courts also recognize that state constitutions give legislatures plenary authority to
make policy in certain areas. See, e.g., Lujan v. Colorado State Bd. of Educ., 694 P.2d 1005
(Colo. 1982). The Colorado Supreme Court held that "financing... education in Colorado
is not only the proper function of the General Assembly, but this function is expressly
mandated by the Colorado Constitution." Id. at 1025.
It has also been argued that legislatures are more suited than courts to formulate
comprehensive policy. See, e.g., Cruzan ex rel. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 426-27
(Mo. 1988) (presenting a four point argument favoring legislative policy-making about rightto-die issues).
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II. ARKANSAS CASES

Significant communication of policy views are present between the
Arkansas Supreme Court and the Arkansas General Assembly. Each
institution, however, is careful in the way it communicates its policy
preferences to the other and respects the authority of the other. "The
influence between these two branches is very real but very subtle,"
according to Justice Steele Hays. "It gets very sticky if the court actively
lobbies for substantive change in the law."' 8 My interviews with Arkansas's
policymakers indicated that the court's primary means of communicating its
policy preference to the legislature is through its opinions. Chief Justice
Jack Holt acknowledged, "The court makes conscious use of its opinions to
make suggestions to the legislature."' 9
When the court conveys its policy preferences in its published opinions,
however, it does not (as some state supreme courts do) send copies of the
opinions to the legislature. Nor does it convey, beyond comments in the
opinions themselves, that the legislature should take note of particular
opinions. The court does use several other channels to communicate with
the General Assembly. The channel chosen depends primarily on the nature
of the message. Formal state of the judiciary messages are delivered to the
legislature by the chief justice; these are limited to a discussion of the
operation of the state courts and matters of procedural law concerning the
court system. On extremely rare occasions justices have testified before
legislative committees or the legislative council. This testimony has
concerned either the structure of the state's court system or procedures
concerning the removal of judges. Also, when the legislature requests it, the
court administrator provides information on the operation of the courts.2"
A.

Policy Background

This study examines Arkansas's system of providing compensation to
court-appointed counsel representing indigent defendants in criminal cases.
Over a period of forty years the United States Supreme Court gradually
expanded the obligation of the states to provide counsel for indigent criminal
18. Interview with Steele Hays, Justice, Supreme Court of Arkansas, in Little Rock,
Ark. (Dec. 14, 1993).
19. Interview with Jack Holt, Chief Justice, Supreme Court of Arkansas, in Little Rock,
Ark. (Dec. 14, 1993).
20. The information identifying channels of communication the Arkansas Supreme Court
uses to convey its policy views to the General Assembly is based on interviews I conducted
with members of the court and the state senate in December 1993.
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defendants.2 Furthermore, the states themselves were expanding this right,
and in 1963 when the Supreme Court decided the landmark case Gideon v.
Wainwright,22 only five states did not provide, either by statute or practice,
for appointed counsel in noncapital felony cases.2 3 In the 1970s, the states
began to face increasing constitutional requirements to provide counsel for
indigent persons accused of crimes. The spiraling cost of compensating
court-appointed counsel was so great it could no longer be absorbed by the
private bar. As lawyers began to resist appointment as counsel unless they
received reasonable compensation, state supreme courts began to call on the
legislatures to restructure the system for compensation.24 To do this, courts

often included in their opinions a call for the legislature to restructure the
statutory provisions for compensating court-appointed counsel.2 5

21. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972) (holding that states must provide
counsel in all cases when deprivation of liberty is a possible outcome); Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (holding that state courts must provide counsel in all
serious criminal cases); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956) (holding that states must
provide counsel to indigent persons convicted of crimes who pursue an appeal when such
review is generally available to persons able to pay for such an appeal); Powell v. Alabama,
287 U.S. 45, 73 (1932) (holding that the states must provide counsel to defendants who face
capital punishment and are incapable of providing their own defense because of ignorance,
illiteracy, or some other similar deficiency).
22. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
23. The five states were Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, North Carolina, and South
Carolina. For arguments supporting the extension of this requirement to all states see, Yale
Kamisar, The Right to Counsel and the FourteenthAmendment: A Dialogue on "The Most
Pervasive Right" of an Accused, 30 CHI. L. REv. 1, 19 (1962); William Beaney, Comment,
The Right to Counsel: Past, Present, and Future,49 VA. L. REV. 1150, 1153 (1963).
24. The Supreme Court of Kansas reviews these cases in State ex rel. Stephan v. Smith,
747 P.2d 816, 838-41 (Kan. 1987). For a comprehensive history of the development of law
concerning the compensation of court appointed counsel before state supreme courts were
actively involved in the issue, see B. Finberg, Annotation, Construction of State Statutes
Providing for Compensation of Attorney for Services Under Appointment by Court in
Defending Indigent Accused, 18 A.L.R.3d 1074 (1968); C.T. Dreschler, Annotation, Right
of Attorney Appointed by Courtfor Indigent Accused to, and Court's Power to Award,
Compensation by Public, in Absence of-Statute or Court Rule, 21 A.L.R.3d 819 (1968).
25. In addition to the Arkansas cases discussed in this article, other states' supreme
courts have included such policy messages to the state legislature in the following opinions:
DeLisio v. Alaska Superior Court, 740 P.2d 437 (Alaska 1987); Makemson v. Martin County,
491 So. 2d 1109 (Fla. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1043 (1987); People v. Randolph, 219
N.E.2d 337 (Ill. 1966); State ex rel. Stephan v. Smith, 747 P.2d 816 (Kan. 1987); State ex
rel. Wolfe v. Ruddy, 617 S.W.2d 64 (Mo. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1172 (1982); State
v. Green, 470 S.W.2d 571 (Mo. 1971); Brown v. Comm'rs of Washoe County, 451 P.2d 708
(Nev. 1969); Smith v. State, 394 A.2d 834 (N.H. 1978); State v. Rush, 217 A.2d 441 (N.J.
1966); State v. Lynch, 796 P.2d 1150 (Okla. 1990); Bias v. State, 568 P.2d 1269 (Okla.
1977); Bedford v. Salt Lake County, 447 P.2d 193 (Utah 1968); Honore v. Washington State
Bd. of Prison Terms and Paroles, 466 P.2d 485 (Wash. 1970); Jewell v. Maynard, 383 S.E.2d
536 (W. Va. 1989); State ex rel. Partain v. Oakley, 227 S.E.2d 314 (W. Va. 1976).
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The Arkansas Constitution requires the court to appoint counsel for
indigent defendants. 6 Attorneys in Arkansas have been appointed to defend
indigent persons since the current constitution was adopted in 1874;
however, not until 1953 were they compensated for their services to indigent
defendants. At that time, the legislature enacted statutes delegating the
payment of indigent defense fees to the counties.27 Since that time, the
statutes providing compensation for court-appointed counsel and setting the
fees to be paid were revised several times. It was not until 1985 that the
legislature established a public defender system for larger counties and
placed partial responsibility for payment of indigent defense fees on the
state.2 8 Between 1980 and 1993, five Arkansas Supreme Court opinions
called on the legislature to reform the method of compensating courtappointed counsel. An examination of these policy messages to the General
Assembly provides insight into various ways these messages expressed the
court's policy preferences and how effectively they influenced legislative
policy. What is learned from this analysis can then be compared to similar
data from other states.
B.

Court Calls for Legislative Action

State v. Ruiz & Van Denton2 9 was the first Arkansas Supreme Court
opinion concerning the compensation of court-appointed counsel that
included a policy message from the court to the General Assembly. The
court had addressed this issue in an earlier decision, but that opinion did not
include a policy message to the legislature.3" In Ruiz, the court-appointed
defense challenged the statutory limit on compensation for counsel appointed
to represent indigent defendants. He argued the maximum payment of $100
for investigation expenses and $350 for attorney fees was legislative
interference with a judicial function and violated the provisions of the
Arkansas Constitution for separation of powers. 3' The court, however, ruled

26. ARK. CONST. art. II, § 10 (providing that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions the accused
shall enjoy the right.., to be heard by himself and his counsel."). The supreme court has
held this to guarantee the right to counsel. See Philyaw v. State, 288 Ark. 237, 704 S.W.2d
608 (1986).
27. Act of Mar. 11, 1953, 1953 Ark. Acts 276 (codified at ARK. STAT ANN. §§ 43-2415
to -2418 (repealed 1971)).
28. Act of Apr. 17, 1985, 1985 Ark. Acts 1076 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-92108 (repealed by Act of Apr. 19, 1993, 1993 Ark. Act 1193)).
29. 269 Ark. 331, 602 S.W.2d 625 (1980).
30. Pulaski County ex reL Mears v. Adkinson, 262 Ark. 630, 560 S.W.2d 222 (1978).
31. Ruiz, 269 Ark. at 332, 602 S.W.2d at 626.
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that the legislature did not usurp judicial power by setting these monetary
limits.32
This opinion was a textbook example of judicial restraint. Although it
deferred to the General Assembly's authority, the court did criticize the
system of compensation created by the legislature, stating, "We do not imply
that the present statutory allowances even come close to providing adequate
compensation for the services performed in this case."33 The court also
questioned the wisdom of requiring the counties to compensate courtappointed counsel and contended that logic suggests that if counties are
unable to pay the statutory fees then the state should do so, but the court
concluded, "this question of adequate compensation is not a matter to be
addressed by the court but is within the province of the legislature."' Even
though the court was critical of the inadequate compensation provided by
the fee system and of the great burden it placed on the counties, the court
found that the arguments in this case did not provide a basis to find the
system unconstitutional. The court maintained that designing a system to
compensate counsel for indigent people "is a35matter that must be left to the
sound discretion of the General Assembly.
In this opinion, the court's policy message to the legislature was
characterized by criticism of the existing policy and by an indication that
statutory reform was needed. However, the court suggested no alternative
to the county-funded system it criticized. The General Assembly enacted
no changes in response to the court's call for revisions of the statutes. This
issue continued to be brought before the court, and in each case the court's
opinion included a stronger call for legislative action.
C.

Two Opinions Warn Legislature of Coming Changes

Ten years after Ruiz, the Arkansas Supreme Court decided two cases
that challenged the statutory fee system for compensating court appointed
lawyers. Although the court continued to uphold the constitutionality of the
statutes, in these opinions the court indicated that it had not closed the door
on Fifth Amendment "taking" or Fourteenth Amendment due process
challenges to the fee system. In Pickens v. State,36 the court implied that it
might favorably consider a takings argument;3 7 however, the lawyer in this
32. Id. at 335, 602 S.W.2d at 627.
33. Id.
34. Id.

35. Id.
36. 301 Ark. 244, 783 S.W.2d 341, cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1011 (1990).
37. Id. at 248, 783 S.W.2d at 343.
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case had volunteered to serve as counsel.38 Therefore, the court reasoned,
he had no standing to base a claim on the takings clause of the Fifth
Amendment.39 Concluding the opinion, the court wrote, "Whatever the
trend may be to hold such fee limits unconstitutional, this is not the case in
which we will consider the issue." 4 The court's message in Pickens was a
different than Ruiz. In Pickens, the court expressed dissatisfaction with the
fee system in a way that threatened the policy by suggesting it might be
constitutionally unsound. But this case did not provide the situation
necessary to challenge the statute's constitutionality. The legislature took
no notice of the court's hint of dissatisfaction with the statutory limits on
compensation and introduced no legislative reform.
Less than a year later Coulter v. State4' presented the court with a
second opportunity to address the constitutionality of the fee system. In
Coulter, an indigent person convicted of a capital offense claimed that his
defense was prejudiced by the $1000 statutory cap on reimbursement of
appointed counsel fees in capital cases. 2 The court agreed with the
appellant's arguments that the cap might be unconstitutional for several
reasons, including denying due process by preventing adequate representation by counsel; however, the court found that, in this case, the fee cap did
not prevent an effective defense.43
The court's opinion again threatened the statute by telegraphing the
clear message that it was willing to reconsider a due process challenge to
the statutory fee system stating, "We give notice that, in an appropriate case,
we will reconsider our earlier decisions on this issue. This is not the
case." This view of the majority was augmented by Chief Justice Holt's
concurring opinion. It underscored the call for legislative action stating:
Under these present arrangements, it is obvious that our judicial system
is not complete, and will not be, until funds are provided to reasonably
compensate the attorneys who are required to represent truly indigent
defendants. This could be accomplished by the creation of a state-wide
public defender system for both trial and appellate work. Hopefully, the
General Assembly of Arkansas will readdress this issue expeditiously;
otherwise the burden and responsibility will soon fall up on the courts to
erase this blotch on our system.45
38. Id. at 256, 783 S.W.2d at 348.
39. Id.

40. Id. at 257, 783 S.W.2d at 348.
41. 304 Ark. 527, 804 S.W.2d 348 (1991).
42. Id. at 545, 804 S.W.2d at 358.
43. Id.
44. Id.

45. Id. at 547, 804 S.W.2d at 359.
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Chief Justice Holt stated that this concurrence was intended to suggest
mechanisms the legislature might adopt to adequately compensate court
appointed counsel.46 He noted that "[t]he court usually uses concurring
opinions as a means of suggesting ways the legislature can meet statutory
'
needs created by a court opinion."47
Chief Justice Holt also confirmed that
the Coulter opinion was intended to warn the legislature that given the
appropriate case, the court would strike down the cap on compensation.48
His concurring opinion reiterated the court's call for the legislature to
change the system, and then suggested that the legislature create a statefunded public defender system as a means of providing court-appointed
counsel.49
The General Assembly was in its biennial session when the Coulter
opinion was issued and the legislature responded to the opinion. Senator
Wayne Dowd, chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, stated that the
committee took note of the opinion and began to draft legislation. However,
not enough time remained in the session to act on the court's message.5"
Five months later, in 1991, the court accepted a case that allowed it to
review the constitutional questions raised by Pickens and Coulter.
D.

Court Call to Replace a Constitutionally Voided Statute

The appeal of Arnold v. Kemp 5 ' provided the court with the facts it
needed to overturn the fee limits on compensation for court-appointed
counsel. In Arnold, the appointed counsel for an indigent defendant in a
capital murder prosecution refused to proceed after the trial court denied him
reimbursement for out-of-pocket expenses and refused to supply his client
with the funds to hire necessary investigatory and expert assistance.52 After
the trial judge found defendant's counsel in contempt, he appealed the

46. Interview with Jack Holt, Chief Justice, Supreme Court of Arkansas, in Little Rock,
Ark. (Dec. 14, 1993).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Coulter, 304 Ark. at 548-49, 804 S.W.2d at 360.
50. Telephone Interview with Wayne Dowd, Senator, Arkansas State Senate (Nov. 16,
1993).
51. 306 Ark. 294, 813 S.W.2d 770 (1991); see also John B. Arango, Arkansas Supreme
Court Finds Cap on Fees and Expenses for Appointed Counsel Unconstitutional,6 CRIM.
JUST. 47 (Fall 1991); Terri Schull, ConstitutionalLaw-Indigent Defense--Arkansas Statutory
Fee and Expense Limitation Unconstitutional,Arnold v. Kemp, 14 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J.
595 (1992).
52. Arnold, 306 Ark. at 296, 813 S.W.2d at 771.
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contempt ruling to the supreme court. 3 In its decision, the supreme court
held that (1) the legislatively established caps for death penalty cases ($1000
for fees and $100 for expenses) constituted an unconstitutional taking of
property, and (2) a mixed public defense system in which attorneys in nonpublic-defender counties were required to financially subsidize the state's
responsibility for indigent representation violated attorneys' equal protection
rights. 4 Therefore it declared the statute, as applied, unconstitutional."
Although the decision originated in a death penalty case, the court applied
its findings to the entire system for compensating court-appointed counsel.
The court opinion contained a clear message to the General Assembly.
The court noted that since 1971 the legislature had been addressing, in a
piecemeal way, the problem of financing compensation for court-appointed
counsel, but held that this treatment was not sufficient. "Even though the
legislature may take 'one step at a time' in addressing complex problems,
it does not have license to infringe upon the guaranteed constitutional rights
of the citizens it represents."56 The court's message in the Arnold opinion
was a third type. The statute was held to be unconstitutional in its
application, but the court did not suggest an alternative policy to fill the
policy vacuum it created.
The court's decision left a constitutional void that the legislature needed
to fill. As a member of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Senator Mike
Bebee stated that the legislature is "by necessity more responsive to policy
57
vacuums created when the court strikes down an unconstitutional policy.
When the Arnold opinion was issued, the Senate Judiciary Committee had
already drafted reform legislation in response to the Coulter decision. The
court issued its Arnold decision while the legislature was between sessions.
When a special session was called in November 1992, the leadership of the
General Assembly and Governor Bill Clinton made the decision not to
include the compensation-for-counsel issue in the call for the special session.
They determined that the special session should address more pressing
matters.58 These interviews confirmed the assumption that some legislation
introduced in response to court opinions never gets enacted or is only
enacted after being introduced over a period of several years.

53. Id.
54. Id. at 306, 813 S.W.2d at 777.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 304, 813 S.W.2d at 776.
57. Interview with Mike Bebee, Senator, Arkansas State Senate, in Little Rock, Ark.
(Dec. 14, 1993).
58. Id.
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After Arnold, the court issued an opinion, State v. Post,59 that made
even more sweeping constitutional determinations. Although the changes
to the system were not enacted by the legislature until after the court had
issued its decision in Post, it is not unreasonable to claim that the Arnold
Arnold,6'
opinion played a role in bringing this change about. Post' and
along with Pickens62 and Coulter,63 are part of a string of cases that
contributed to legislative changes. This author considers the reform
legislation enacted in 1993 to be, in part, a response to the court's message
in Arnold.
E.

Court Recommendations to Replace a Constitutionally Voided Policy

The Arkansas Supreme Court's calls for statutory reform of the system
for compensating court-appointed counsel extended over more than a
decade. In its Ruiz opinion, the court held that the statutory caps on fees
were constitutional, but urged the legislature to develop a state-financed
system for funding this expense.' 4 The legislature took no action. In the
Pickens65 and Coulter6 6 decisions, the court left the statutory caps intact, but
warned that in an appropriate case it would reconsider challenges to the
systems constitutionality. These warnings elicited no response from the
legislature. In Arnold,67 the court found an appropriate case to hold the
statutory caps unconstitutional in their application. Before the next
legislative session convened, the court issued an even more expansive
decision addressing the compensation statutes in State v. Post.8
As a result of the Arnold decision, the cost of indigent defense rose
substantially. In a capital murder case, one of the defense attorneys was
awarded $23,138. Before Arnold was decided, the fee would have been
limited to $1000. The judge allocated the responsibility for paying the fee:
59. 311 Ark. 510, 845 S.W.2d 487 (1993). See also John B. Arango, Arkansas Supreme
CourtRules State Responsiblefor Indigent Defense Costs, 8 CRIM. JUST. 40 (Summer 1993).
60. 311 Ark. 510, 845 S.W.2d 487 (1993).
61. 306 Ark. 294, 813 S.W.2d 770 (1991).
62. 301 Ark. 244, 783 S.W.2d 341 (1990).
63. 304 Ark. 527, 804 S.W.2d 348 (1991).
64. State v. Ruiz & Van Denton, 269 Ark. 331, 602 S.W.2d 625 (1980). See supra
notes 29-35 and accompanying text.
65. Pickens v. State, 301 Ark. 244, 783 S.W.2d 341 (1990). See supra notes 36-40 and
accompanying text.
66. Coulter v. State, 304 Ark. 527, 804 S.W.2d 348 (1991). See supra notes 41-49 and
accompanying text.
67. Arnold v. Kemp, 306 Ark. 294, 813 S.W.2d 770 (1991). See supra notes 51-56 and
accompanying text.
68. 311 Ark. 510, 845 S.W.2d 487 (1993). See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
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$450 to the county, and the remainder to the state. The state appealed this
award to the supreme court in State v. Post.6 9 The state argued that in a
context where Arnold made the state's fees statute ambiguous, legislative
intent should determine responsibility, and the legislature clearly intended
that counties pay. In its Post decision, the court invalidated the entire fees
statute and any county ordinances derived from it.70 The court held that
striking down the statutory delegation of responsibility for payment of fees
to the county returned the responsibility for payment to the state.7 The
practical consequence of the decision was that the state was left without a
comprehensive system to provide monies to pay compensation to counsel
representing indigent criminal defendants. This message to the legislature
in the Post opinion differed from that in the Arnold opinion. The court not
only struck down the existing policy, but it also suggested the possible
alternative that the legislature develop a state-funded system for compensating court-appointed counsel.
In its 1993 session, the legislature responded to the court's rulings in
both Arnold and Post. The General Assembly thoroughly complied with the
court's policy recommendation by enacting Act 1193.72 The Act established
the system recommended by the court in Post. It created trial public
defender's offices and required that an indigent defense fund be established
by each county. 7 The Act provided alternative ways for the quorum courts
(county commissions) to set up public defender offices in counties.74
Provisions were made for more than one county to work together in
establishing and maintaining such offices. 75 Furthermore, additional
personnel were provided to county courts to administer the assignment of
indigent cases. 76 Finally, a statewide public defender's office was established to assume the responsibility for defending all indigent persons
77
charged with capital crimes.
The response of the Arkansas General Assembly to the Post opinion
restructured the statutory system for providing compensation for courtappointed counsel. The new statutes provide a solution to the problems that

69.
70.
71.
72.
ANN. §§
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

311 Ark. 510, 845 S.W.2d 487 (1993).
Id. at 516-17, 845 S.W.2d at 490.
Id. at 521, 845 S.W.2d at 492.
Act of Apr. 19, 1993, 1993 Ark. Acts
16-87-104 to -214).
ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-87-206 (Michie
Id.
Id.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-87-208 (Michie
ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-87-205 (Michie

1193 (codified as amended at ARK. CODE
Supp. 1995).
Supp. 1995).
Supp. 1995).
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the court pointed out to the legislature in its opinions in the compensation
cases decided over the previous thirteen years.
III. JUDICIAL-LEGISLATIVE POLICY MAKING IN ARKANSAS

A former New Jersey Supreme Court justice, discussing the court's
willingness to make politically controversial decisions, commented that "no
thicket was too political for us."" It is unlikely that more than a few state
supreme court justices would concur in that view. A broad survey of the
literature on state supreme courts leads one to expect that not many state
supreme courts would so boldly claim an activist role for themselves. This
is true of the justices of the Arkansas Supreme Court; yet, they are clearly
aware of the political nature of their decision making. At least from time
to time, the Arkansas Supreme Court enters a thorny thicket and makes
policy in areas generally seen as the bailiwick of the General Assembly. At
other times the court must resolve pressing political issues presented by the
cases that come before it.
The four justices of the Arkansas Supreme Court who were interviewed
expressed respect for the General Assembly and an overall willingness to
defer to the policy-making authority of the legislature. None of them,
however, expressed a reluctance to strike down legislative policy when they
felt it was necessary. Justice Hays expressed the same sentiment heard from
the other three justices, "The court exercises a degree of restraint when it
deals with legislative enactment, and will usually only strike down
deficiencies when they are so glaring that they cannot be ignored."79 Justice
Hays is well acquainted with the court opinions that require substantial
legislative action and an increase in state spending. He wrote the court's
opinion in Arkansas's landmark school finance case."0
78. LEHNE, supra note 15, at 43.
79. Interview with Steele Hays, Justice, Supreme Court of Arkansas, in Little Rock,
Ark. (Dec. 14, 1993).
80. Dupree v. Alma Sch. Dist. #30, 279 Ark. 340, 651 S.W.2d 90 (1983). This case
is another example of policy messages in opinions of the Arkansas Supreme Court
influencing legislative policy-making. In Dupree, the court found that the system for
financing public schools resulted in inequitable per-student funding among the state's school
districts. This inequality was held to be a violation of the Arkansas Constitution's
requirement that the state "maintain a general suitable and efficient system of free public
schools." ARK. CONST., art. XIV, § I. The court struck down the statutory provisions that
financed the schools. The governor called the legislature into extraordinary session. The
General Assembly's response was prompt, positive, and extensive. The School Finance Act
of 1984 was enacted and provided for equalization of funding based on a weighted average
daily attendance in the school districts. See Act of Nov, 1, 1983, 1983 Ark. Acts, First
Extraordinary Session 34.
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Each of the justices agreed that they consider the potential political and
economic impact of their decisions; however, they also downplayed the
influence such considerations had on their decisions. Justice Hays said there
is a significant awareness on the part of the court of the cost of requiring
certain policies, such as financing the public schools. "Judges are very
aware of the political repercussions of their decisions," he said, "especially
when they are going to increase spending by the state. The court has
discussed the budgetary implications for the state that decisions might
have."'" Hays's colleagues on the Arkansas Supreme Court agree. Justice
David Newbern elaborated,
We are not blind to the consideration of the political, social, and
economic impact of our decisions. In formal conferences we examine
what the effect of a decision we are about to make will be and its impact
priorities.
on the state budget. We are sensitive to the state's funding
82
That doesn't control what we decide, but we do discuss it.
Chief Justice Holt agreed that the court considers the political implications
of its decisions, but he added that judges are still bound by what the facts
of the case are and what the law requires them to do. He explained,
I think about the social and economic effects that a decision may have,
but I make my decision based on what I think is the correct answer to
the question of law presented by the case. An awareness of the farreaching effects of a decision makes me look at the question and my
answer three or four times.83
At times, the court feels compelled to render decisions the judges would
rather settle in a different way. Justice Newbem said, "We are sometimes
criticized for decisions we would have rather decided another way, but
couldn't because the law didn't permit that decision." But, he explained, if
the court's opinions are written in a way that points out how a statute is
inconsistent or too narrowly drawn, the legislature will often adjust or
change it. 4
Justice Donald L. Corbin expressed what seems to be the controlling
factor in constitutional decision making on the Arkansas Supreme Court.
He said,
81. Hays, supra note 79.
82. Interview with David Newbem, Justice, Supreme Court of Arkansas, in Little Rock,
Ark. (Dec. 14, 1993).
83. Interview with Jack Holt, Chief Justice, Supreme Court of Arkansas, in Little Rock,
Ark. (Dec. 14, 1993).
84. Newbem, supra note 82.
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Being a supreme court judge is like living on a mountain. We must face
constitutional issues and are less aware than legislators of the moods and
opinions of the people. We are conscious of the overriding legal issues.
Our responsibility, as we see it, is if there is a [constitutional] wrong, we
right the wrong. It is what we were hired to do. The legislature has the
purse strings, it is their responsibility to meet the problems. It is not my
problem to find the funds.85
The justices are aware of and consider the political ramifications of
their decisions. They also maintained strongly that although they are willing
to make decisions with far-reaching economic and political implications, the
controlling factor in all of their decisions is the application of the law and
legal principles to the questions before them.
Members of the General Assembly are aware of the policy messages
sent in supreme court opinions. Senator Wayne Dowd said that the Senate
Judiciary Committee staff monitors court opinions.8 6 Senator Mike Bebee
said that members of the legislature are especially aware of policy messages
in supreme court opinions. The Senate tends to have a disproportionate
number of lawyers; it is not unusual for more than half of the senators to be
attorneys. Bebee said that most of the lawyers in the Senate practice before
the supreme court and are alert to litigation that may have significance for
the legislature. 87
The General Assembly is generally receptive to the policy ideas
expressed in supreme court opinions. Although he acknowledged that
legislators' feelings about such policy messages vary, Larry Holifield,
Assistant Director of the Arkansas Bureau of Legislative Research said,
There was not much negative feeling in the legislature about the court's
several decisions requiring a change in the provisions for paying courtappointed lawyers. The focus was on what to do, the general consensus
[among legislators] was that the court's decision was correct.88
The legislature is receptive to the court's suggestions for policy direction;
however, it is also willing to make changes in policy that the court
85. Interview with Donald L. Corbin, Justice, Supreme Court of Arkansas, in Little
Rock, Ark. (Dec. 14, 1993).
86. Telephone Interview with Wayne Dowd, Senator, Arkansas State Senate (Nov. 16,
1993).
87. Interview with Mike Bebee, Senator, Arkansas State Senate, in Little Rock, Ark.
(Dec. 14, 1993).
88. Interview with Larry Holifield, Assistant Director, Arkansas Bureau of Legislative
Research, in Little Rock, Ark. (Dec. 14, 1993).
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establishes, Holifield said. 9 When legislators think the court has misread
legislative intent in its interpretation of a statute, a new statute will be
enacted, and it will be noted in the legislative finding, in the emergency
clause appended to the act, that the legislation is intended to correct the
court's interpretation of the statute it amends.9"
The communication between the Arkansas Supreme Court and the
General Assembly is healthy, informal, and relatively effective. Senator
Bebee would like to see a more formal structure for communications
between the court and the legislature. "Both branches should be sending
their concerns to the other branch," he said, "the communications need to
be balanced and apolitical."9 1 It is not known how widely this view is held
by other legislators. Members of the court, however, are satisfied with the
largely informal channels of communication between the two branches.

IV.

ARKANSAS AND THE NATIONAL PATTERN OF
COURT-LEGISLATIVE COMMUNICATION

The patterns of policy communications between the Arkansas Supreme
Court and the General Assembly are a reflection of findings from
examinations of the supreme courts and legislatures in other states.
Research has shown that state supreme courts seek to influence policymaking by the state legislature.9 2 It has also been found that including
policy messages in court opinions is the principal way that courts convey
their policy messages to the legislature.93 Interviews with supreme court
justices and state senators indicate that opinions are the means the Arkansas
Supreme Court uses to convey its policy views to the General Assembly.
Members of both institutions indicated that they are comfortable with this
way of communication and believe it is reasonably effective.'
The General Assembly's response to the policy messages the court
included in the five opinions concerning the compensation of courtappointed counsel indicates that it responds sooner and more favorably to
policy messages that create a policy vacuum than to those that merely
89.

Id.

90. Id.
91. Interview with Mike Bebee, Senator, Arkansas State Senate, in Little Rock, Ark.
(Dec. 14, 1993).

92. Glick, supra notes 12 and 14; ROCHA & WEBKING, supra note 15.
93.

Glick, supra note 12.

94. I interviewed members of the legislatures and supreme courts in three other states:
Kentucky, Texas, and West Virginia. The relationship between the court and legislature
seemed to be somewhat more amiable in Arkansas than the other three states. Among the
four states the least amiable relationship is in Texas.

1996]

ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT

criticize the existing policy or lack of policy and call for the legislature to
remedy the situation. The pattern of communication between the court and
legislature in Arkansas is similar to that which I found in other states.
I examined fifty-two legislative responses to the policy-messages
contained in fifty-six opinions of the supreme courts of twenty-six states.95
The opinions concerned three policy areas: the right to die, equality in
public school finance, and provisions for compensating court-appointed
counsel. The policy-messages varied greatly in their tone, authority, and
specificity. The messages implied, lamented, cajoled, suggested, recommended, insisted, and required. I designed a taxonomy of eight message
types (four of these types are found in the Arkansas cases reviewed in this
article).96 The legislatures responded to these messages at four levels. The
first level is no response: the legislature does not enact a statute in response
to the court's message. Another level is a deficient response: the legislature
responds by enacting statutes that either partially meet the needs identified
by the court or that fail to meet constitutional requirements set by the court.
A third level is a positive response: the legislature amends existing
provisions or enacts new statutes in response to the court's general call for
the legislature to address a policy problem, perhaps hinting at the general
95. At times, the legislatures responded to two or more court messages, because more
than one opinion contained a message that was delivered during the time frame in which the
legislature could respond. For example, during one legislative session, the court may issue
more than one opinion on a subject and ask for legislative action. This reduced the author's
number of legislative responses from 56 to 52.
96. Following are the types and examples of opinions that contain such messages. (I)
General call for legislation to rectify a lack of policy. This type notes or criticizes lack of
policy and calls for legislative action, but offers no policy preferences. See Severns v.
Wilmington Med. Ctr., 421 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1980). (2) Recommendations for legislation to
rectify a lack of policy. .This type notes or criticizes lack of policy and suggests policy. See
Lovato v. 10th Dist. Court in & for the 10th Judicial Cir., 601 P.2d 1072 (Colo. 1979). (3)
General call for changes in or expansion of statutes. This type criticizes existing policy and
calls for legislative action; however, it offers no policy preferences. See State v. Ruiz & Van
Denton, 269 Ark. 331, 602 S.W.2d 625 (1980). (4) Recommendations for changes in or
expansion of statutes. This type criticizes existing policy, and it suggests alternative policy
or recommends policy direction. See State v. McAfee, 385 S.E.2d 651 (Ga. 1989). (5)
Decisions threatening to existing policy. This type expresses displeasure with existing policy
or practice in a way that endangers or threatens the policy but does not strike it down. See
Coulter v. State, 304 Ark. 527, 804 S.W.2d 348 (1990). (6) General call to replace
constitutionally voided policy. This type strikes down a policy without suggesting an
alternative policy. See Arnold v. Kemp, 306 Ark. 294, 813 S.W.2d 770 (1991). (7)
Recommendations for replacing constitutionally voided policy. This type strikes down a
policy and suggests possible policy alternatives; however, it doesn't require its adoption. See
State v. Post, 311 Ark. 510, 845 S.W.2d 487 (1993). (8) Requirements for replacing
constitutionally voided policy. This type strikes down policy and establishes policy
requirements that must be adopted. See State ex rel. Stephen v. Smith, 747 P.2d 816 (Kan.
1986).
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direction the policy should take. The fourth level of response is thorough
compliance: the legislature incorporates the court's specific policy recommendations or requirements into the statutes it enacts.
The legislatures responded in these fifty-two cases by enacting
legislation in thirty-eight cases. In thirty of those cases the enactments
complied with the recommendations or requirements made by the court. In
the remaining eight cases the statutes enacted were inadequate in that they
partially complied with the court's request by establishing a study commission, adopting some of the court's suggestions, or the statutes were deficient
because they did not make the changes the court required. In the fourteen
cases in which the legislatures enacted no law, it should be noted that in six
of the cases the legislature enacted statutes in response to messages that
made the same or similar suggestions or recommendations in later opinions.
My cross-state examination of the state supreme court opinions and the
legislative responses to them demonstrates that state supreme court opinions
are an effective way for the courts to communicate their policy preferences
to state legislatures. Generally, state legislatures make full or partial
responses to policy messages contained in the opinions of state supreme
courts. Several conclusions were drawn from this research. First, legislatures usually enacted new statutes in line with the suggestions, recommendations, or requirements made by the state supreme courts. This was
discovered to be true in thirty-eight (seventy-three percent) of the fifty-two
cases reviewed. Second, when state supreme court decisions established
policies or rules that addressed the question at hand and then called for the
legislature to enact more comprehensive policy, the legislature was more
likely to delay a response or make no response. Legislative priorities are
established partly in response to outside pressures. The pressure for
legislative action can be diminished when court rules and decisions meet
immediate policy demands. Third, when state supreme court decisions
created a policy void, there was a higher probability that legislatures would
respond to the courts' call for legislative action. The legislatures responded
with statutory amendment or enactment to eighty-eight percent of the court
opinions that struck down the existing policy. The affirmative response rate
to the other opinion types was fifty-nine percent. Finally, when the
legislature did not respond to state supreme court calls for new statutes, the
courts usually succeeded at prodding legislatures to adopt the recommended
policies if they persisted in making similar recommendations in successive
opinions.
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V. CONCLUSIONS

The examination of the political dynamic between the Arkansas
Supreme Court and the General Assembly confirms the findings from my
larger cross-state study, but more importantly, it illustrates the findings by
providing insights and color from individual cases that aggregate data do not
provide. Over a period of thirteen years, the Arkansas Supreme Court called
for the General Assembly to restructure the state's system of compensating
court-appointed counsel. During that time the court's call for reform
became stronger and its stated policy preferences became more specific.
The policy message in Ruiz was a general call for changes in the statutes;
although the court criticized the existing policy, it held the compensation
system to be constitutional and did not suggest policy alternatives for the
legislature to consider. The court's messages in Pickens and Coulter were
stated more strongly. The court implied that it saw constitutional deficiencies in the statutes and threatened to find them unconstitutional in future
cases. In the Coulter opinion, the court suggested specific alternatives to the
existing policy. In Arnold, the court found the existing policy unconstitutional in its application, without suggesting an alternative to fill the policy
vacuum. Finally, in Post, the court declared the existing policy to be
unconstitutional on its face and suggested an alternative policy but did not
require its adoption.
The legislature did not enact any legislation in direct response to the
Ruiz opinion; however, in the years between the Ruiz and Pickens opinions,
there was some tinkering with the statutes. Justice Donald L. Corbin, who
served in the Arkansas House of Representatives during this period, told me
that a number of bills intended to reform the compensations system were
introduced.97 Some of these proposals were enacted.98 Legislation was
introduced in response to the Coulter decision, but was not enacted before
the court's decisions in Arnold and Post. The legislative process is time
consuming, and it seems reasonable to speculate that the reform set in
motion by Coulter would have become law without the influence of Arnold
and Post. The later decisions, however, kept the pressure on the legislature
and created a policy void that was difficult for the legislators to ignore.
This sequence of developments supports the argument that when the
legislature does not respond to state supreme court calls for new statutes, the
courts will usually succeed at prodding legislatures to adopt new policy if
97. Interview with Donald L. Corbin, Justice, Supreme Court of Arkansas, in Little
Rock, Ark. (Dec. 14, 1993).
98. Act of Apr. 17, 1985, 1985 Ark. Acts 1076 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-92108 (repealed by Act of Apr. 19, 1993, 1993 Ark. Acts 1193)).
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they persist in making similar recommendations. The Arkansas cases also
support the contention that if the court sends stronger messages and/or
creates policy vacuums, the legislature is more likely to follow the directions
the court recommends.
This examination of the Arkansas cases and the interviews conducted
in Arkansas indicates that the policy-making influence between the Arkansas
Supreme Court and the General Assembly is similar to that in other states.
The five successive court opinions that included increasingly stronger
policy-messages to the General Assembly, as well as the General Assembly's response to them, provide a clearer, more detailed picture of this
dynamic than do the data from the larger cross-state study. The candid,
informative interviews with the Arkansas justices and senators provided an
insight into the substance of the human and political dimensions of the
policy-making relationship between state legislatures and supreme courts that
is described by the aggregate cross-state data.

